Herbert v Mitcham

• Jurisdiction: Saint Kitts and Nevis
• Judge: Floissac, C.J.,Byron, J.,Singh, J.
• Judgment Date: 27 September 1993
• Neutral Citation: KN 1993 CA 6
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1992
• Court: Court of Appeal (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
• Date: 27 September 1993

Court of Appeal

Floissac, C.J., Byron, J. and Singh, J.

Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1992

Herbert

and

Mitcham

Appearances:

Mr. Vernon Veira, Mr. Lindsay Grant with him for the appellant

Respondent in person

Tort - Damages — Negligence — Road traffic accident.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

1 On Saturday, March 23, 1991 at about 11 a.m., at the junction of Cayon street and Victoria Road, the appellant's and the respondent's vehicles collided resulting in damage to both vehicles. On March 4, 1992, in a Suit for negligence brought against the respondent by the appellant for the damage to his vehicle, Magistrate Lynch-Wade, having heard evidence from the appellant and the respondent and from the police officer who investigated the accident, in his reasons for decision, considered the following four possibilities, whether:

• (1) both drivers were to be blamed;

• (2) the appellant was to be blamed;

• (3) the respondent was to be blamed;

• (4) neither the appellant nor the respondent was to be blamed;

2 and concluded as follows:

“Having not been able to apply the principle of ‘A balance of Probabilities’ in apportioning blame the court dismissed the Suit and made no order for costs.”

3 The appellant appeals for this order of the learned magistrate and contends that the magistrate erred in law when he failed to determine the matter on a balance of probabilities, this being a civil matter.

4 On this issue, the law is trite that the standard of proof required in a civil matter of this nature is proof on a balance of probabilities. The magistrate, from his reasons for decision, found himself unable to apply this standard of proof, yet be purported to dismiss the suit of the appellant. We find it difficult to understand how in these circumstances he could have, arrived at the conclusion to dismiss. We therefore find this ground of appeal.

5 The appellant, as his second ground of appeal, contends that the magistrate having failed to decide the matter on a balance of probabilities erred in not finding in favour of the appellant This ground necessarily involves an excursion into the facts. The evidence of the appellant shows that he drove out of Victoria Road and turned left into Cayon Street when the respondent drove his car out of Fort Street and turned right into Cayon Street thereby hitting the appellant's right back fender. The respondent's version is that he drove out of Fort Street and turned right Cayon...