Percival v The Queen

• Jurisdiction: Saint Kitts and Nevis
• Judge: Joseph, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 11 April 1994
• Neutral Citation: KN 1994 CA 4
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1993
• Court: Court of Appeal (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
• Date: 11 April 1994

Court of Appeal

Floissac, C.J.; Byron, J.A.; Joseph, J.A.

Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1993

Percival

and

The Queen

Appearances:

Appellant in Person.

Mr. Malcolm Holdip for the Prosecution.

Criminal Law - Appeal — Appeal against conviction and sentence — Appellant indicted with offence of manslaughter — At trial, verdict of “guilty but insane” returned — Whether verdict is safe, in the circumstances — Verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity” substituted.

1 Joseph, J.A. (AG.): The appellant was indicted with the offence of manslaughter contrary to common law. The offence was alleged to have been committed on 25th April, 1991 at Molineux in the Parish of Christ Church in St. Kitts.

2 At a trial on 7th October, 1993 presided over by HYLTON, J. the jury returned a verdict of guilty but insane. The appellant was ordered to be detained until the pleasure of the Governor-General be known. He appeals against conviction and sentence.

3 Mary Williams who was over 80 years old and lived alone was helped to bed around 10:00 p.m. on 24th April, 1991 by Rebecca Henry who took care of her. The inference from the evidence is that she was partially incapacitated.

4 In the early hours of 25th April, 1991 a neighbour awoke from sleep and saw Miss Williams' house on fire. Charred remains were found in the house. The Doctor concluded that the remains were of female sex and that the victim had burnt to death. The allegation was that the appellant set fire to Mary Williams' house and that she was burnt to death.

5 The verdict of insanity was based on the evidence of Dr. Isben Williams (a Psychiatrist) who was called as a witness for the prosecution and who was not cross-examined. Dr. Williams concluded his testimony as follows:-

“From my opinion and knowledge of Accused I would say in April, 1991 he was likely to have been in an active psychotic state. In accused's particular case he was not in control of judgment. It is also likely that he was deluded and so was not fully aware of the nature and consequence of what he was doing”.

6 The learned Judge told the Jury that three verdicts were open to them:-

• 1) guilty as charged

• 2) guilty but insane

• 3) not guilty.

7 The second verdict was replaced by a 1976 amendment to Section 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Chapter 20) to “not guilty by reason of insanity” which section enacts

“Where, in an indictment, any act or omission is charged against any person as an offence, and it is given in evidence on the trial of such person for that offence that he was insane, so as not to be responsible according to law for his actions at the time when the act was done or the omission made, then, if it appears to the jury before whom such person is tried that he did the act or made the omission charged, but was insane as aforesaid at the time when he did or made the same, the jury shall return a special verdict to the effect that the accused person was not guilty by reason of insanity”.

8 However before the special verdict can be returned the Jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the act that resulted in the death of Mary Williams. The learned Author of Archbold Forty-third Edition Volume 2 p. 1361 paragraph 17–35 writes:-

“It is however important to observe that before the jury can return the special verdict the prosecution must first have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did the act or made the omission charged. If they fail to prove this the defendant is entitled to be acquitted simpliciter whether or not he was insane at the time of the alleged offence”.

9 A person who does an unlawful act that results in the death of another person may be guilty of manslaughter which may arise in two ways:-

The first —the result of an unlawful act which all sober and reasonable persons would inevitably realise must subject the victim to the risk of harm resulting whether the Accused realised it or not.

It is only if the appellant's act is unlawful and dangerous would the appellant be guilty of manslaughter. Both limbs —unlawful ‘and dangerous —have to be satisfied.

It can be said that smoking a cigarette in bed where there is a probability of the smoker falling asleep, and where the appellant did fall asleep is a dangerous act but can it be said to be an unlawful act —even though the appellant fell asleep on a bed in a house to which he had not been invited, that is, he was a trespasser. That is arguable.

The second manner is...