Sherriff v Rawlins

• Jurisdiction: Saint Kitts and Nevis
• Court: High Court (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
• Judge: Mitchell, J.
• Judgment Date: 14 December 1981
• Neutral Citation: KN 1981 HC 3
• Docket Number: 42 of 1979.
• Date: 14 December 1981

High Court

Mitchell, J.

42 of 1979.

Sherriff

and

Rawlins

Appearances:

C. F. Henville for plaintiff.

C. Wilkin for the defendant.

Real property - Landlord and tenant.

Facts: A contract existed between the deceased and the plaintiff, before the death of the deceased which enabled the defendant to occupy a house belonging to the deceased without rent. This agreement was continued by the plaintiff execution for a short period after the death of the deceased. Whether the agreement constituted a tenancy at will and whether it had been duly terminated.

Held: That the Rent Restriction Ordinance, Cap. 30 was not applicable and gave the defendant no protection —The Ordinance did not apply to the tenancy at will. That the tenancy at will had been duly determined. Plaintiff granted an order for possession of the premises.

Mitchell, J.

1 The plaintiff sued as the executor of the estate of Winifred Williams, deceased.

2 The plaintiff asserted that at the date of her death Winifred Williams had been allowing the defendant to occupy a portion of the upper storey of her residence at George Street, Basseterre, as a tenant at will.

3 Winifred Williams died on the 16th June, 1970, and the plaintiff/executor allowed the defendant to continue to occupy the dwelling house as a tenant at will.

4 The plaintiff/executor duly terminated that tenancy by serving on the defendant on 23rd April, 1979, a notice to quit the said premises on 31st May, 1979.

5 The plaintiff claimed possession of the said premises.

6 The defendant in her statement of defence admitted inter alia that at the date of her death Winifred Williams had been allowing the defendant to occupy a portion of the upper storey of her residence at George Street, Basseterre, as a tenant at will.

7 When the matter came up for actual consideration by the Court Mr. C. Wilkin for the defendant, informed the Court that the service of the notice to quit was no longer an issue.

8 He withdrew a counterclaim which was filed on behalf of the defendant.

9 Both Mr. Henville for the plaintiff and Mr. Wilkin for the defendant agreed that no evidence would be led in this case and that it would be strictly a matter of law for legal arguments only.

10 Mr. Wilkin stated that the basis of his argument was as to whether the word “let” permitted of a tenancy at will.

11 He referred to Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition Volume 23, page 742 at paragraphs 1495 and 1496 which are concerned with the “Meaning of dwelling-house” and the “Meaning of let” respectively.

12 In paragraph 1496 under the heading “Meaning of. let” it was stated inter alia that “Sub-tenancies are within the Acts (The Rent Restriction Acts) as are tenancies at will at a rent”.

13 The significant words in that extract in the context of this case are “at a rent”.

14 There is no statement of fact or evidence that the defendant, Constance Rawlins ever paid rent.

15 Rent has been described as the recompense paid. by the tenant to the landlord for the exclusive possession of corporeal hereditaments.

16 Counsel for the defendant referred to Chamberlain v. Farr [1942] All E.R. 567, C.A. in which it was held that the Rent Restriction Acts apply to a tenant-at-will paying rent.

17 That case does not assist the defendant.

18 He further stated that if the rent Restriction Act, Chapter 3CP of the Laws of the State of Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla applied, there are certain grounds which must exist in order that an order and ejectment be made.

19 Mr. Henville for the plaintiff stated that a notice to quit was not necessary in this case.

20 He referred to the case of Martinalt v. Ramuz and Another [1953] 2 All E.R. 892 in which at page 893, letter G, Denning, L.J. stated:-

“It is elementary that a tenancy at will is determined by a demand for possession, not by a notice to quit. These tenancies at will were determined by the issue of a writ claiming possession, which is itself a demand for possession”.

In Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant under the heading “Tenancy at Will” it is stated:-

“Either party may at any time determine a strict tenancy at will, although expressed to be held at the will of the lessor only and the landlord may determine it by a demand of possession or otherwise without a previous formal notice”.

21 and in Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition Volume 23 at page 507 paragraph 1154 it is stated under the heading “Determination of tenancy at will”:

“A tenancy at will is determined by either party on his expressly or impliedly intimating to the other his wish that the tenancy should be at an end”.

and at paragraph 1155 under the heading “Determination by Landlord”:

“Anything which amounts to a demand of possession, although not expressed in precise and formal language, is sufficient to indicate the determination of the landlord's will”.

22 Both the plaintiff and the defendant have used the words “tenant at will” but it may nevertheless be questioned whether in the circumstances of this case the defendant was a tenant at will or a licencee.

23 The fact that an agreement grants a right of exclusive possession is not in itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy.

24 However, in so far as both Counsel for the plaintiff and Counsel for the defendant have accepted the premise and argued on the premise that the defendant is a tenant at will without reference to her being a licensee I shall thus not dwell upon the implications of such a status.

25 The case of Wheeler v. Mercer [1957] A.C. 416, H.L; [1956] 3 All E.R. 631 is illuminating.

26 In that case R. M. Megarry Q.C. as he was then and James Fox-Andrews for the respondent argued that assuming that the respondent was a tenant at will, her tenancy was within the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954 in that Section 23 of that Act included a tenancy at will as it used the words “any tenancy”.

27 That is not unlike the argument advanced by Counsel for the defendant when he said that a tenancy at will...